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Abstract
Prior to the modern era of active shooter events, the standard training for patrol officers responding to an ongoing shooting
event required the responding patrol officer(s) to contain the shooter in the building where the attack was occurring, control
access to the location, attempt to communicate with the shooter, and call the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team.
Recently, research has been undertaken to empirically examine different law enforcement response options. This article
details one such experiment. The article details a tactic known as the peek. Utilizing an experimental design, we present
findings regarding the peek room entry technique.
Keywords
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Introduction
On February 25, 2016, an active shooter event began with
the attacker randomly shooting vehicles on a highway in
Kansas (Berman, 2016). The shooter then drove to Excel
Industries (a lawn mower manufacturer) in Hesston, Kansas,
entered the building, and began shooting employees. Police
Chief Doug Schroeder was the first officer to arrive on scene.
He immediately entered the building by himself, found the
attacker, and engaged him in a gun fight. The attacker was
killed but murdered three people and wounded 14 others
before he died. Chief Schroeder is credited with saving many
lives by preventing the shooter from incurring a higher casualty rate.
Chief Schroeder’s actions illustrate a new trend in active
shooter response―solo officer response. This article examines two commonly taught solo officer techniques for clearing rooms. We will refer to these as the peek and the push.
Given the inherent dangers of responding to active shooter
events, identifying a room entry technique that mitigates the
danger to responding officers is imperative. The majority of
active shooter events that police officers arrive at are still
ongoing and the shooter has not been stopped or subdued
(Dorfsman, 2014; Martaindale, Sandel, & Blair, 2017). First,
we discuss the history and development of active shooter
response in the United States.

Development of Response to Active
Shooter Events
Prior to the modern era of active shooter events, the standard
training for patrol officers responding to an ongoing shooting
event required the responding patrol officer(s) to contain the
shooter in the building where the attack was occurring, control access to the location, attempt to communicate with the
shooter, and call the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
team (Blair, Nichols, Burns, & Curnutt, 2013). SWAT
teams—not responding officers—were expected to engage
and handle the shooter.
During the shooting at Columbine High School, this is
what patrol officers did. The first patrol officer on the scene
engaged one of the shooters while he was outside of the
building, but when the shooter retreated into the building, the
first officer did not pursue. The responding patrol officers
created a perimeter around the building, called for the SWAT
team, and assisted victims who were on the outside of the
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Figure 1. Blind corner of a room.

building while they waited for the SWAT team to come deal
with the shooters. It took the SWAT team more than half an
hour to assemble and enter the building. During this time, the
shooters had free rein in the school to murder students and
staff. Twelve students and one teacher were killed.
There was significant public outcry following the
Columbine shooting, prompting police departments across
the United States to examine their response tactics. Police
departments around the country changed from expecting
their patrol officers to contain violent situations and call for
SWAT teams to handle the shooting, to expecting patrol officers to enter the attack location and stop the shooter(s) themselves. Relying on SWAT teams to respond and subdue the
shooter is unrealistic if police departments want to save lives,
which is priority in active shooter events (Doherty, 2016).
Initial training for this change in response was drawn
from the training given to SWAT team officers (Blair et al.,
2013). Under the guide of the initial training, patrol officers
arriving on the scene were taught to form teams of four or
five officers, make entry into the building where that attack
was occurring, and stop the killing. Experience with actual
events and the delay that waiting for four to five officers to
assemble created led to additional changes in policies. Police
departments began allowing officers in smaller groups of
two to three person teams to make entry. However, this still
created delays that the departments found unacceptable in
their responses to active shooter events. Now, we are seeing
police departments across the United States authorizing their
officers to make solo entry to stop the killing of innocent
people.

Tactics
Responding to active shooter events is dangerous, and officers are frequently shot (Blair & Schweit, 2014). In addition,
some early analysis of active shooter events suggests that
solo response to these events may be more dangerous than
team response (Blair, Martaindale, & Nichols, 2014).
Recognition of the danger inherent in the response to violent
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events has led to the development of many tactics designed
to help mitigate the harm.
The tactical policing community and researchers have
argued that room entries are one of the most dangerous
aspects of active shooter response (Blair & Martaindale,
2013, 2017; Blair et al., 2013). A room entry is defined as
any time that an officer leaves an area that he or she currently
controls and enters an area that he or she does not. For example, officers may be proceeding down a hallway and come to
a room that might contain an attacker. When the officers
leave the hallway and enter the room, they are conducting a
room entry. Room entries can also include moving from the
outside of a building to the inside or moving from one room
to another in a series of connected rooms.
Blair and Martaindale (2013, 2017) argue that room
entries are dangerous because the entering officers are moving from an area where they can see threats to one where they
must expose themselves to potential new threats while simultaneously attempting to detect the threat. In addition, an
attacker waiting inside of a room has an advantage in that he
or she will know where the officers must enter the room (i.e.,
the door) and the attacker can position him or herself to try
and gain an advantage against entering officers.
A variety of techniques to reduce the risks to officers
when conducting room entries have been developed in recent
years. Among these is threshold evaluation (or slicing the
pie). This technique involves the officer moving from one
side of the doorway to the other while staying in the area that
he or she already controls (Blair et al., 2013), for example,
moving from the left side of a door to the right side while
staying in the hallway. This allows the officer to see most of
a room without having to physically enter it. However, there
will always be part of the room that the officer cannot see
from the hallway. In the tactical policing community, this
location is referred to as the blind corner or corners. Figure 1
illustrates this blind corner for a room where the door is near
one of the corners of the room (referred to as a corner-fed
room in the tactical policing community). If the door is in the
center of the room (referred to as a center-fed room in the
tactical policing community), there will be two blind corners
(one on each side of the door).
Research into room entries is fairly limited and much of
what has been done focuses on more than one officer performing an entry. This is because in the tactical policing
community, room entries are generally performed by more
than one officer. Blair and Martaindale (2013), for example,
reported a series of studies that examined how the entry paths
and order of entry of two officers affected the performances
of both the officers and the waiting suspect. These studies
found a technique they called “the hybrid” provided to be the
best combination of officer speed and accuracy of fire while
reducing the suspect’s accuracy of fire.
Blair and Martaindale (2017) reported on another room
entry study where they examined the impact of throwing a
chair into a room in an attempt to distract the attention of the
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accuracy of the suspect and can throw off his or her aim.
There has also been some suggestion that the peek will cause
suspects to focus their fire on the exposed parts of the officer’s body, particularly the officer’s hands and head, thereby
producing more hits that are potentially immediately incapacitating to the officer. Proponents of the push also argue
that it allows them to teach only one entry technique that can
then be scaled to the number of people conducting the entry;
whereas, teaching the peek requires also teaching the push
for teams of officers.2

Hitting a Moving Target

Illustration 1. The peek.

suspect away from the door of the room. This was done in
response to findings in previous research (Blair &
Martaindale, 2013; Blair et al., 2011) which suggested police
officers were at a reaction time disadvantage when dealing
with suspects in general or performing room entries. They
found that throwing a chair pulled the attention of suspects
away from a door and gave the entering officers a slight reaction time advantage.
Because these studies assumed that multiple officers
would be entering the room, they used what we refer to as a
push style entry. All of the entering officers moved completely into (pushed) the room. This allowed all of the entering officers to move into a position to engage (shoot at) the
suspect should it be necessary. However, when a solo entry is
being conducted, the solo officer does not necessarily need to
push all the way into the room to clear the blind corner and
engage a suspect. Instead, the solo officer can perform what
we refer to as a peek (sometimes also called a lean). When
using this technique, the officer keeps as much of his or her
body as possible in the hallway and moves only his or her
head, shoulders, arms, and weapon into the room (see
Illustration 1). Some active shooter training programs are
currently teaching this technique (e.g., the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center).
Proponents of the peek argue that the technique allows the
solo officer to minimally expose him or herself to an attacker
when clearing a room. A waiting suspect will only be able to
see the peeking officer’s upper body, and therefore the officer is provided with some “cover.”1 Proponents of the push
argue that the lateral movement of the push affects the

Lateral movement is considered the primary advantage of the
push. It is theorized that this movement decreases shooter
accuracy, thus improving officer safety. Limited studies exist
regarding one’s ability to intercept a moving target in clinical
settings, and no studies specifically address firing a weapon
at a moving target. Regardless, these scholarly works lay the
theoretical foundation for the peek versus push room entry
study. Previous studies are focused on two primary types of
object interception—that is, locomotor interception and
manual interception. Locomotor interceptions refer to tasks
where the individual moves her entire body to intercept a
target, such as running to catch a ball or a predator chasing
prey (see Chardenon, Montagne, Buekers, & Laurent, 2002;
McBeath, Shaffer, & Kaiser, 1995; McLeod & Dienes,
1996). Locomotor interceptions are not considered rapid
intersections that occur in fractions of seconds; therefore,
locomotor interceptions utilize what is known as on-line
visual information. On-line visual information can be viewed
as real-time data. When running to catch a ball, the individual does not have a predetermined path to intercept the ball;
rather, the individual constantly adjusts to real-time data to
make the catch (Tresilian, 2005).
Manual interception refers to tasks where an individual
only utilizes arm movements to intersect either a stationary
or moving object. Research has shown that the underlying
interception models that apply to locomotor interceptions do
not apply to manual interceptions (McLeod & Dienes, 1996;
Tresilian, 1995). Instead, manual interceptions utilize preprogrammed timing control models to accurately intercept
either stationary or moving targets (Tresilian, 2005; Tresilian,
Plooy, & Carroll, 2004). For example, an individual reaching
to pick up a stationary ball would utilize a preprogrammed
movement based on the location of the ball. If the ball is rolling on the floor, a preprogrammed movement can be efficiently utilized based on the estimated intersection of the ball
and the hand. Tresilian (2005) argues that preprogrammed
control models also explain manual interception of rapidly
moving targets (i.e., <500 milliseconds). According to
Tresilian (2005), when an object is moving rapidly (e.g., hitting a 90 mph fastball), the individual does not have time to
receive and process visual feedback and adjust movement
patterns. Rather, the individual has a preprogrammed
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intersection point to attempt to contact the rapidly moving
object. According to this viewpoint, if the preprogrammed
intersection point is slightly off, the individual will miss the
fastball.
If the response time is slightly longer, the individual can
process some feedback and adjust the preprogrammed movement toward the intersection point. There are many theoretical forms of this feedback process (e.g., biphasic
preprogrammed model, discrete correction model). During a
biphasic preprogrammed movement, the individual makes
an initial, rapid preprogrammed movement to close the distance, and then a second movement is performed based on
any visual feedback to attempt to close the final intersecting
distance (Tresilian, 2005). If visual feedback is blocked or
unprocessed for any reason, the default response is the previously discussed preprogrammed model.
We believe the literature on hitting moving targets provides a foundation for the current research endeavor. Both
the peek and the push room entry require the suspect to
rapidly fire their weapon at the entering officer. As this process will occur in a fraction of a second, a preprogrammed
control movement will be performed by the suspect. During
the peek room entry, the officer leans into the room to
engage the suspect. This movement presents the suspect
with a stationary target at a predicable height. As such, the
suspect’s preprogrammed movement should be slight and
result in an accurate shot. However, during a push room
entry, the suspect is presented with rapid lateral movement
by the entering officer. This rapid lateral movement will
require the suspect to estimate where the officer will be and
perform a preprogrammed control movement to attempt to
shoot him. We believe this will result in less accurate shot
placement. In addition, the officer will be slowing down
once he has completed the push room entry. We believe it is
possible the suspects will perform a biphasic preprogrammed movement and adjust follow-up shots on the
slowing target.
Research questions. This study will attempt to unwrap the differences in both room entry styles by addressing the following research questions:
Research Question 1: Does the style of room entry (peek
or push) affect the shooting accuracy of a suspect?
Research Question 2: Does the style of room entry affect
where the suspect’s shots hit the entering officer?
Because we will be recording these encounters and can
analyze them frame by frame, we will also address an additional research question:
Research Question 3: Does the style of entry affect the
reaction time of the suspect?

Method
Design
This study used a 1 × 2 independent groups design where
participants were randomly assigned to a condition. The first
condition utilized the push entry technique and was considered the control condition. The experimental condition
involved the officer using the peek method of entry.
Participants were unaware of the room entry technique that
the officer would use. Each participant was assigned to a
condition on a rotating basis.

Sample
Participants were recruited from a number of different criminal justice courses at a large central Texas university. Extra
credit was offered in a variety of ways, depending on the
professor teaching the class. The goal was to achieve a sample of 100 students so that each condition would have 50
participants. Fifty students in each condition would provide
an approximate power of 0.80 to detect moderate differences
within the t distribution (d = 0.50; Cohen, 1988). To ensure
that the goal sample of 100 students was met, the researchers
oversampled from the criminal justice courses. A total of 165
individuals completed the experiment.

Procedure
This study was conducted at a secure law enforcement facility. The participants, who played the role of murder suspect
attempting to ambush responding police officers, were
granted access to the facility to participate in the study. After
participants signed the consent forms and filled out the
demographic information, a Positive Science vision tracker
was placed on them. This system utilized an eyeglass frame
that houses two cameras. One camera faces the scene and
records what the participant can see, while the second camera faces the right eye and tracks the participant’s pupil. The
eyeglass frame is connected via cable to a laptop in a backpack. The laptop contains Yarbus (the software program) that
allows the researcher to later sync the two camera videos
with a superimposed dot that shows where the participant is
looking on the scene camera. It does this based on the pupil
orientation in relation to the scene camera. For the purposes
of this study, we used only the scene camera to determine
when the officer entered the room and when the suspect
fired. The camera records at 30 frames per second. Each participant was then shown the training pistol and how it operated. Participants were then given the chance to test fire the
training pistol to get the feel for its operation. This was also
done as a safety measure to ensure safe firearms operations
by the individuals. The training pistols were loaded with
force-on-force rounds. These were primer powered rounds
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that are filled with colored soap to mark where they hit. The
training pistol looks and operates like an actual pistol and
fires the projectiles at about 300 ft per second. The individual
was then placed in the blind corner of the room. The blind
corner comprises about 15% of the room’s area that the
police officer cannot see from the doorway. The participant
was told that in this scenario, he or she is has just killed
someone, is now running from the police, and has run into
this corner to attempt to ambush responding officers. The
participant was then given a loaded training pistol and told to
face the open door where the police will be entering.
Participants were told that they have one round to fire at the
police, but the scenario will not begin until the proclamation
of “the room is hot” to indicate that the officer can enter the
room at any moment.
Once the researcher exited the room and the scenario was
announced “hot,” the researcher, playing the role of the officer, would then perform the assigned entry tactic. The role of
the officer was played by the same researcher for both conditions, push and peek, throughout the study. For the control
condition, the officer would make a hybrid, or diagonal,
room entry. This type of room entry involves the officer
quickly moving to the center of the room and engaging the
suspect when he or she has the opportunity. Upon entering
the room, the officer fires a single blank round at the participant. In the experimental condition, the officer merely peeks
his head into the room with the blank gun outstretched
toward the participant. He then fires a blank round while
never leaving the doorway. The officer used a blank gun;
therefore, participants did not require safety equipment. One
reason for using blank rounds instead of the soap-filled
rounds is because it is not possible to wear protective head
and eye gear while also wearing the eye tracker. The officer
was wearing protective headgear to ensure no harm would
befall him. Once the officer and participant had fired their
weapons, a cease fire was called and both individuals placed
their training pistols on the ground.
After the completion of each scenario, the researcher playing the role of the officer recorded if the participant had fired
his or her weapon and if the fired round had hit the researcher.
In addition, the location of the hit was recorded. Cameras
were used as a backup measure for determining whether the
participant shot the hit location if applicable.

Results
Sample
As previously mentioned, 165 participants completed the
study. There were 81 participants in the control condition and
84 participants in the experimental condition. There were
some missing data for different measures. Where data were
missing, the cases were excluded as the n’s below indicate.
Ten runs in the experimental condition and eight participants
in the control condition had missing data. Data could be

missing for a number of reasons including the student deciding not to participate after signing in (n = 7), the equipment
malfunctioning (n = 3), the individual not firing his or her
weapon at all (n = 4), or the individual firing his or her
weapon before the officer made entry (n = 4). Cases with
missing data were excluded, bringing the total number of
participants down to 147 (74 in the experimental condition
and 73 in the control condition). Of the 147 participants, 58
were female, 86 were male, and three were unknown. Fortythree percent of the sample were Caucasian, 42% were
Hispanic, 11% were African American, and the remaining
4% were Asian or did not identify their race. Two participants had prior law enforcement and military experience and
three had prior military experience only. The average age of
the participants was 20.34 years old (SD = 2.35).

Hits
Research Question 1 asked if there was a difference in overall participant accuracy between the Peek and Push conditions. Participants in the Peek condition successfully shot the
entering officer in 25 (33%) of the 76 usable runs. Participants
in the Push condition successfully shot the entering officer in
32 (44%) of the 73 usable runs. This difference was not significant at the p < .05 level (Fisher’s Exact test = .18) and is
suggestive of a small effect size (ϕ = .11). Research Question
1 then suggests that there is only a small (nonsignificant) difference between entry tactics in the overall accuracy of the
participants.
Research Question 2 asked if there was a difference in the
location of the hits on the entering officer based upon condition. Peek conditions participants hit the entering officer’s
head 3 times, torso 7 times, arms 7 times, and hands 8 times
(See Figure 2). Push condition participants shot the entering
officer in the head 3 times, torso 15 times, arm 9 times, hand
3 times, and leg 2 times. As can be seen in Figure 2, the
entering officer places his hands in front of his face, which is
his shooting position. This suggests the rounds that strike the
officer’s hands will carry through to his head. In addition, the
officer’s head and hands do not have ballistic protection (like
a Kevlar vest for his torso). Taken together, we argue that
hand and head hits are very likely to be immediately disabling for the entering officer, so we collapsed the hits into
two categories. These were Head Hits (consisting of hits to
the head or hands) and Other Hits (consisting of all the other
hits). In the Peek condition, the participants scored 11 Head
Hits and 14 Other Hits. In the Push condition, the participants scored six Head Hits and 26 Other Hits. These differences were significant at the p < .05 level (Fisher’s Exact
Test = .047, two-tailed) and suggested a moderate effect size
(ϕ = .27). The results of examining Research Question 2
suggest that there was a difference in where shots hit the
entering officer by condition. Specifically, officers were
moderately more likely to be shot in the head when using the
Peek entry.
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Figure 2. Hit locations by condition.

Figure 3. Reaction times and effect size (ES) with standard
errors.

Reaction Time
Research Question 3 asked if there was a difference in suspect reaction time based upon entry style. As can be seen in
Figure 3, the mean reaction time of the participants in the
Peek condition was 0.76 s (SD = 0.42). The mean reaction
time of the suspects in the Push condition was 0.64 s (SD =
0.33). This difference was not significant, t(139.2) equal
variances not assumed = 1.86, p = .06, but exhibited a moderate effect size (Cohen’s d =.31). Although the difference
was not large enough to be statistically significant, participants in the Push condition were moderately faster shooting
than those in the Peek condition.

Discussion
This article examined the impact of two different room entry
types on suspect accuracy: shot hit locations and reaction
time. Overall, the results present a mixed picture.

Although participants hit the entering officer more in the
Push condition than in the Peak condition, the difference in
hits was not statistically significant and the effect size was
small. Although not significant, our findings were in the
opposite direction of what was suggested by research into
manual interceptions. It may be that the entering officer was
not moving fast enough or far enough to create a difference
in the manual interception tasks between conditions.
Furthermore, during a Push, the participant is presented with
a full-body target while only the upper torso and head is presented during the Peek. The larger Push condition target may
have inflated the shot accuracy of the participants in that
condition.
In addition, the officer performing the Peek condition was
moderately more likely to be shot in the head. This suggests
that while officers might be shot more often in the Push condition than the Peek, when they are shot performing a peek,
they are more likely to be shot in a way that is immediately
disabling (e.g., shot in the head). Again, this may be a function of only the upper torso and head being visible to the
participant in the Peek condition while the whole body is
presented in the Push condition.
Participants in the Push condition had a moderately faster,
but statistically nonsignificant, reaction time than those in
the Peek condition. However, the observed reaction time difference did present a moderate effect size (Cohen’s d = .31).
Although this difference was only about one tenth of a second quicker reaction time, previous research has indicated
that these small differences are often enough to determine
who fires first in similar scenarios (Blair & Martaindale,
2013). This suggests that suspects in the push entry are more
likely to shoot before the entering officer than suspects faced
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with peek entries. It may be that the smaller target presented
by the officer in the Peek condition caused the participants in
this study to slow down just a little bit to aim more accurately
at the smaller target. In addition, the fast reaction times in
both conditions suggests that the participants were using
pure manual interception (e.g., anticipating where to shoot)
rather than manual interception combined with feedback or a
locomotor type interception.
Given the mixed findings of this study, it is difficult to
recommend one entry technique over the other. Each has
strengths and weaknesses. The push may have a slight edge
in that it can be used either by solo responders or a team (see
Note 2).
Like any study, this one had limitations. The Force-onForce training rounds used in this study are similar to small
paintballs and will not penetrate walls. It is therefore possible
that the hit rate in the Peek condition was underestimated
because rounds that hit the wall in a way that would have
penetrated and hit the officer (if they were actual bullets)
were instead stopped. In addition, while these scenarios are
considered moderately stressful, it is impossible to replicate
the stress of an actual shooting situation in the laboratory.
Also for the purposes of control, we only gave each suspect a
single round to shoot. In an actual firefight, numerous rounds
would be fired by both the participant and the officer.
Despite these limitations, we believe that this study provides important information to practitioners and policy makers about the effectiveness of two room entry types. It is our
hope that this information can help protect police officers
when they are performing this dangerous task.
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Notes
1.

2.

The term “cover” here is used colloquially. In the tactical community, “cover” refers to things that can physically stop a bullet. Typical interior walls in American construction (sheetrock
and two-by-fours) will not generally stop bullets.
It is possible to have two officers conduct a peek using a
hi-low technique; however, this technique has fallen out of
favor because of incidents where the low person moved in an
attempt to avoid fire and was shot in the back of the head by
their partner. This is particularly a concern when discussing
techniques for patrol officers who have fewer opportunities to

practice and train than SWAT personnel and also cannot be
certain about the training level of the people that they are with
when responding to an active shooter event.
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